Caring for the Details-A Humane ...

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Rejoinder: Caring for the Details: A Humane Reply to Buckley and Buckley
Author(s): E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley
Source: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Summer, 1995), pp. 353
-357
Published by: Oxford University Press
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Journal of the
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Journal
of
theAmerican
Academy
of
Religion
LXIII/2
Rejoinder: Caring
for the Details: A Humane
Reply
to
Buckley
and
Buckley*
Context matters. Because
Buckley
and
Buckley
(hereafter
B&B)
repeatedlyignore
the
larger
contextof our
paper
(i.e.,
our earlier
papers
and
Rethinking
Religion)and,
frequently,
the
paper
itself,
they
errone-
ously
attributeviews to us that we have neverheld
and,
in some
cases,
that we have
explicitly
attackedelsewhere.
Strange
conduct for
champi-
ons of
contextualized
interpretations.
Nowheredo we claim that the crisis of conscience in
anthropology
arose
"simply"
or
"entirely"
from
complicity
with colonialist
oppression
nor that such collaborationwas
"uniformly"practiced
nor that it was
"solely"responsible
for the
methodological
reactions we discuss! We
thought
some
complicity
in colonialist
oppression
uncontroversialon the
basis of
anthropologists'
own
testimony
(e.g.,
Bloch).
Unlike
B&B,
how-
ever,
we cannot
regard
any
"anthropological
contributions to colonial
oppression
as
largely
trivialat worst!"If it's
oppression,
it's
wrong.
If it's
wrong
(especially
on the scale thatcultural
oppression
is),
it's never"triv-
ial at worst."
(We
did warn about the moral
failings
of
hermeneutics.)
The critical
point, though,
is not the
reality
of such
complicity
but the
perceptions
thatit occurredand that
somethingought
to be done aboutit.
Many (including
B&B)
think the
proper
reaction is to abandon some
(nowhere
do we claim
"all")
cultural
anthropologists'
scientific
aspira-
tions.
Maintaining
that"scientific
analysis
... is the
problem,"
B&Bseem
to
subscribe
to
what
we,
at the risk of
appearing
a tad
hysterical
our-
selves,
describedas "anti-scientific
hysteria."They opt
for
an
exclusively
interpretive
and "humanistic"
approach
to culturaland
religious
materi-
als.
(Note they
nowhere address the
arguments
we advanceabout the
problems
that attend
situatingreligious
studies
among
the
humanities.)
B&B
cheerfullyadopt
what
(both
in "Crisis"and in our
book)
we have
dubbed"hermeneuticexclusivism."On this view all cultural
phenomena
are
fundamentally
embeddedin webs of
significance
which substantiate
their rich
detail,
tie them
intrinsically
to their
contexts,
and root them
ultimately
in human
subjectivity.
These webs of
meaning
in which
humansare
suspended
are,
in
fact,
webs in which
they
are so boundas to
preclude
the
possibility
of
explaining
theirbehavior
by
means of
general
principles,
which of
necessity
decontextualize
and, hence,
according
to
B&B,
must dehumanize. Hermeneuticexclusivistscondemnthe formula-
tion of
general
theoretical
proposals
about culturalmaterials.
Unfortunately,
if cultural
analysis
can never
escape
the
idiographic,
the
subjective,
and the
essentially
contextual,
this raises massive
episte-
mic
problems
for
comparative,
cross-cultural,
and
syncretic
studies.
Even
*Thanksto Pascal
Boyer
for his wise counsel.
353
354
Journal
of
the American
Academy
of Religion
deciding
what to
compare presupposes
theoretical commitments about
the
underlying
cultural realities behind the diverse
appearances.
Claim-
ing "religion
has ... to do with art and
creativity"
embodies theoretical
commitments and
is,
at least in
part,
an
empirical
issue.
(This proposal
is
not
only perfectly compatible
with our
theory
but one it
seeks,
in
part,
to
delineate.)
Not
just good
method but
honesty requires making
those
commitments as
explicit
as
possible.
Effective,
empirically culpable
theo-
ries that
systematically explain
and
predict largely
drive our decisions
about what there is
(including
whether
"religion
. . . does not
exist").
Eschewing general,
explanatory
theories that
identify (fairly)
stable
pat-
terns
underlying
the
appearances
condemns scholars to lives of contem-
plating
nothing
but a
parade
of details.
(McCauley
and Lawson
[in
press])
Throughout
their
paper,
B&B contrast their hermeneutic exclusivism
with an
explanatory
exclusivism to
which,
they repeatedly
insinuate,
we
subscribe. Nowhere do we do so. In
fact,
in
Rethinking
Religion
we made
it
abundantly
clear we will have no truck with
methodological
exclusivism
of
any
form-interpretive
or
explanatory.
We do
think, however,
that a
grievous
imbalance in favor of
interpretive projects
at the
expense
of
explanatory theorizing
has dominated
anthropology
and
comparative
reli-
gion
for the last
thirty years-a
situation which
requires
redress before
both
disciplines
succumb to unconstrained
interpretivism
and anti-scien-
tific
hysteria.
We
urge interpretivists constantly
intoxicated
by
the sweet
cordials of semantic nuance to take the
pledge
and follow Ernest Gellner's
advice to
join
Hermeneutics
Anonymous (Gellner).
Note we do not advocate Prohibition.
Nowhere
do we
reject interpre-
tive
approaches
to cultural materials. We
merely
recommend
balancing
interpretive
and
explanatory
endeavors.
(To say,
as we
do,
that
religion
is
better situated
among
the social and
cognitive
sciences is not to eschew
interpretation-see
Lawson and
McCauley, chapter 1.)
Indeed,
we
argue
for
interactionism,
holding
that a
productive
conversation between the
two activities is
necessary
for the
growth
of
knowledge.
Explicit explanatory theorizing
(rather
than
"imposing
idees
fixes")
makes for
clarity
in
inquiry
rather than
wandering
around in ever
deeper
swamps
of
significance.
This
clarity might
even
occasionally bring
some
empirical accountability
to
analytical proposals
about culture
and,
who
knows,
some
explanatory
insight,
rather than the unconstrained
process
of
meaning propagation
that
prevails. Interpreters
unable to describe
what
possibilities
their
analyses
rule out
only
add to the warehouse of
ethnographic
details.
Methodologically "totalizing,"
exclusivist
interpret-
ers who, a
priori, reject
all
explanatory theorizing simply
thwart the
growth
of
knowledge
and
needlessly impoverish interpretive proposals.
The
philosophical progenitors
of late
twentieth-century
hermeneutics
advanced the textual
metaphor,
because
they
wished to
emphasize
the
interpretability
of
cultural materials. Their
followers, however,
have
Lawson and
McCauley: Responses/Rejoinders
355
become so accustomedto this
metaphor
that
they
havebecomeinsensible
to its influence.
Metaphors
are
things
we live
by (Lakoff
and
Johnson).
The fact of the matteris that the
categories
of
'textuality'
and 'tradition'1
overwhelmingly
dominate
hermeneutically
oriented
scholarship.
We are
exploring
the
consequences
of a
position (metaphoricallyexpressed)
that,
when takento its
extreme,
privilegesliteracy,neglectsreligiousper-
formance,
and
impedes
its
explanation,
and that extremeis
just
where his-
torians of
religion
all too often take it. B&B recommendthe work of
JonathanSmith,
whose
insights
about
interpretive
biaseswe
applaud.
We
are, however,
reminded of a conversationwe had with
this friend and
teacher
twentyyears ago
when we were
beginning
to formulateour
pro-
posals
for a
cognitiveapproach
to
religion.
His
response
was: "Buthow
will all of this
help
me to
interpret
a text?"
Ironically,
B&B
charge
us with
downplayingreligious
creativity
and
"onlygrudgingly"admitting
that new rituals
arise-by quoting
a
passage
out
of
its
comparative
context! We
explicitly
discuss the "creativeand com-
plex"
(215)
characterof evensmall scale
religioussystems.
B&Balso
say
we "avoidthe
question
of
agency."
As
early
as
page
fiveand
throughout
chapter
five of
RethinkingReligion,
we both
emphasize
the
centrality
of
agency
(in
contrast to
earlier,
related
proposals
in
anthropology
from
which we took
inspiration)
and
explicate
its
importance
for a
satisfactory
accountof
religious
ritual.
Contrary
to B&B's
charge,
nowheredo we set
competence
in
opposition
to
performance.
In
fact,
we
emphasize
both the
relative
proximity
of
competence
and
performance
in the case of
religious
ritualand our ultimate
goal
of
producing
accountsof
performance
(Law-
son and
McCauley:
82-83).
A
competenceapproach
to
theorizing
is a
strategy
for
initiating
theorizing
in a field
largely
bereftof detailed theo-
retical
analysis (Lawson
and
McCauley:
3;
McCauley
1986).
Of course
religious
ritual
systems
leak.
Competencetheorizing
cannotaffordto
per-
sistently ignore
issues of
performance
(McCauley1987).
It is to such
issues that we have turned in recent work.
(McCauley
and Lawson
[in
progress])
B&B'sclaim that
anthropologygave
the
cognitive
sciences "fullcon-
sideration"in the 1960s-70s is
misleading
to the extent that those sci-
ences have made
startlingprogress
in the
intervening
years.
As a
result,
some,
including
us,
are
trying
to "make
space
for a
cognitiveapproach
to
religiousphenomena."
The
strategies
we advancedo not
requireany
con-
flict with
"subjectivity,
IIn "Crisis"we
distinguish
two senses of the term"tradition."Herewe referto "tradition"
as
textually
constituted
history-as opposed
to "tradition"
as culturalhabitsand customs.
individuality,
and
specificity."
Our claims about
religious
ritual
applyregardless
of the
meanings
eitherthe scholaror the
participant
attributesto
them.
We maintainthat
common
structuresof
human
cognitivesystemsimpose
constraintson culturalforms. This is an
356
Journalof
the American
Academyof
Religion
empirical hypothesis
the details of
which
we,
Boyer,
and
others are con-
tinuing
to
develop (Boyer).
Science
promises
neither success nor "cer-
tainty,"
as B&B
allege.
It
does, however,
require open,
honest
inquiry
and
enough respect
for the details to care about which ones count.
E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N.
McCauley
References
Bloch,
Maurice
1983
Marxism and
Anthropology:
The
History
of
a Rela-
tionship.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Boyer,
Pascal
1994
The Naturalness
of
Religious
Ideas: A
Cognitive
Theory of Religion. Berkeley: University
of Cali-
fornia Press.
Gellner,
Ernest
1988
"The Stakes in
Anthropology."
American Scholar
57: 17-30.
Lakoff,
George
and
Mark
Johnson
1980
Metaphors
We Live
By. Chicago: University
of
Chicago
Press.
Lawson,
E.
Thomas,
and
McCauley,
Robert N.
1990
Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition
and
Culture.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
McCauley,
Robert
1986
"Problem
Solving
in
Science
and the
Competence
Approach
to
Theorizing
in
Linguistics."
Journal
for
the
Theory of
Social Behaviour 16: 299-312.
"The
Not
So
Happy Story
of the
Marriage
of Lin-
guistics
and
Psychology
or How
Linguistics
Has
Discouraged Psychology's
1987
Recent Advances."
Synthese
72: 341-53.
McCauley,
Robert
N.,
and
E. Thomas Lawson
[in press]
"Who Owns 'Culture?'"Methodand
Theory
in
the
Study of Religion.
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