Caldiero

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2008 Febbraio
Game
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Caldiero 1796
Introduction
After the defeat at Castiglione (5th August), the Austrian FML
Wurmser began a quick retreat along the Tyrol’s mountain
roads. In order to defend its positions, Bonaparte fought, still,
with the strategy, which had enabled him to overcome the
Austrians at Castiglione. While blocking an Austrian column
with weak troops, he went under the other column and beat it
with the main French Army. Being sure of the first Austrian
column’s retreat to the mountains, Bonaparte threw his men on
the second column and beat it too. With this procedure
Bonaparte defeated again Wurmser and Quosdanovich in the
combats of Bassano and Roveredo (September). Hardly pursued
into the mountains, Wurmser found safety only while being
locked up in Mantua where he remained with his battered army.
Indeed, the Austrian army of Italy was again rebuilt with
powerful reinforcements brought from Germany by the Emperor
and recruited in the Frontier lands. Wurmser being wedged in
Mantua, it was necessary to find a new General to command the
Austrian army in Italy. The Hofkriegsrat choice was General
Alvinczy, leader of the new Friaul Armée, who was entrusted
with the high command. Alvinczy set up a new offensive plan.
This one had two objectives:
1. release the Austrian army of Wurmser, locked up in Mantua.
2. take again all the Italian territories the French Army of
Bonaparte had seized in Italy.
Once again, General Bonaparte found himself in the necessity to
fight an Austrian army twice higher in number of troops. To tell
the truth, he was practically in numerical inferiority for eight
months (from April to November 1796). If compared to the two
plans missed by Wurmser, the offensive plan of Alvinczy was
partially more detailed on tactics. This light improvements,
moreover of the numerical superiority of the Austrians, allowed
Alvinczy to inflict to Bonaparte his first historical reverse in the
battle of Caldiero (November 12, 1796).
Alvinczy’s “Friaul Armée”
stopped at Caldiero, Nov. 12th
Late in October 1796, Austrians were completing activities for
their third offensive. A new commander, FML Jozséf Alvinczy,
was given the mission of relieving his antecedent (Wurmser) in
Mantua. Austria tried to assemble some 60,000 soldiers, a
hypothetical superiority of about 20,000 over the Armée d’Italie,
which now included 160 Chasseurs of the “Légion Lombarde”.
At the beginning of November Alvinczy crossed the Piave with
two columns, the right under Quosdanovich and the left under
Marquis de Provera, while Davidovich threatened the Vaubois’
division in the Adige Valley, east of Lake Garda. Following his
verified principle of “central position”, Bonaparte decided to
stop Davidovich’s advance before concentrating against the
main Austrian force: the Army of Friaul. Bonaparte sent
Berthier to Vaubois with orders to attack, while Masséna slowly
withdrew before Alvinczy. On this occasion the plan produced
conflicting results; Vaubois, badly beaten on 6 November;
retreated onto the Rivoli’s Plateau while at the same time,
Masséna seized a chance to inflict a reverse on Alvinczy’s
advance guard. Bonaparte’s irritation at the first defeat in Tyrol
went out in an open censure of Vaubois’ division behaviour:
“Soldiers, I am not satisfied with you; you have shown neither
discipline, nor perseverance, nor bravery; no position could rally you;
you abandoned yourselves to panic; you let yourselves be driven from
positions where a handful of brave men might have stopped an army.
Soldiers of the 39th and 85th [demi-brigades], you are not French
soldiers.
“Then, turning to the chef d’etat-major, he said:
“Let their
colours be inscribed: ‘They no longer form part of the Army of
Italy’.”
(Correspondance de Napoleon I
er
, II 131 - No. 1170).
The two wings of the Army of Italy were forced back near
Verona, but still placed between the Austrians and Mantua.
Bonaparte was in a very difficult situation. If Davidovich had
kept up the energy of his advance, after defeating Vaubois, and
had achieved a link with the Alvinczy’s Army, the French
condition would have been desperate. In all probability this
could have ended the siege of Mantua with Bonaparte facing an
overwhelming force.
On 10 November Alvinczy, informed of Davidovich’s
successes, decided to attack Verona in hopes of linking up with
Davidovich at the same time. On 11 November he reached
Villanova (26 km east of Verona) and sent out a strong advance
guard to the hills running from Caldiero north through
Colognola ai Colli.
From the Caldiero area, the Vedettes of the Austrian advance
guard pushed forward to within two miles of Verona at San
Michele Extra, where stationed 1500 French soldiers. Two
Austrian battalions and two Hussars’ squadrons got in touch
with the S. Michele outposts and convinced the Advance Guard
Command it should be possible to attack Verona on 12th, in the
morning. Alvinczy, carefully, ordered an Intelligence mission to
be performed by large patrols of Cavalry, the quickest riders of
the Empire: the Hussars. He went personally up to Vago to
recognize the situation, while, at the same moment, the French
Arriére Garde withdrew until the eastern city’s access “Porta
Vescovo”.
General Bonaparte was informed about the sudden advance of
the Austrians and probably saw the opportunity to destroy
Alvinczy’s advance guard in its forward position and to build
much needed morale. The French moved out at three P.M. of 11
November, drove in the enemy outposts of San Michele, and
camped at San Martino Buonalbergo, some 8 km east of Verona.
At 16.00 hrs. Major General Prince Frederick Hohenzollern, the
Austrian Advance Guard Commander, retreated to Vago taking
a defensive position along the left bank of a water channel
(Canal de Vago) where a stone bridge let cross the main road to
Verona. Other two support battalion of General Sticker’s
brigade converged with artillery in this point at dusk. By the
same time the Avantgarde of French General Augereau engaged
the bridge. The defenders, leaded by Hohenzollern himself and
Major Siegenfeld, commander of the 7th Croat Grenzer
battalion (Carlstadt Banalisten) lasted until 22.00 hours when
the cold night stopped the attacks. The Austrian lost 47 dead (1
was an Officer), 108 wounded (2 Officers), 249 fugitives or
prisoners (4 Officers); a whole count of 404 soldiers.
That short clash was a bell that alarmed both the opponents
giving the signal to be ready to arms. At midnight Alvinczy had
notice of a French units’ march to monte Giacomo, between
No Turkeys
1
–
2008 Febbraio
Game
2
Vago and Lavagno, and, worrying for his right flank, ordered to
Hohenzollern to withdraw into the village of Caldiero where he
wanted to deploy the new batte-order.
The Austrian front line was then organized with its centre at
Strà, a village or probably only about ten houses scattered along
the main road which leaded from Verona to Vicenza. The left
wing was in a strong position on the two Caldiero’s Heights
(mount San Mattia and La Rocca [the Castle]). The right was on
the Heights of mount Zovo and mount Oliveto reaching the
village of Colognola. The attack against these positions seemed
to be very difficult. The French troops had to march in open
plains, under artillery fire, mounting the bayonets during an
uphill rush in skirmish-formation.
However the risky Bonaparte’s attack was launched early on 12
November with Augereau advancing south of the main road
against Caldiero. Masséna advanced to the north to attack
Colognola and the adjacent hills. The day before Major General
Hohenzollern had reported his impressions on the French units
referring that: “Seem they are all beginning to retreat off Verona
in the attempt to support their general Vaubois, troubled in
Tyrol”. So bad as forecast.
November 12, 1796
(22e Brumaire an V) Defeat at Caldiero
Austrian Friaul Armée, arrived in sight of Verona, woke up in a
solid line on the two hills of Caldiero, 18 km east of the city,
where deployed its strong Advance Guard while the main body
(the Hauptkolonne) was in Villanova. Hohenzollern had just
merged, during the night, his Advance Guard’s troops with the
brigade of Colonel Sticker von Haymingthal, Commander of the
Imperial regiment n. 57 “Graf Joseph Colloredo-Waldsee” also
known as “Alt-Colloredo” (Old Colloredo). The Order of battle
was powerful: about 8000 soldiers and 26 guns, (8 battalions, 9
Hussar Sqns and 2 light Infantry Coys of Jägers, the Mahoney
or Mahony. In effect the first Austrian line was more similar to a
Division than to an Advance Guard formation. The outer
defence at Strà was assigned to the Siegenfeld’s battalion (7th
Carlstädter) which had an horse artillery piece on both flanks
and two heavy 12 pdrs guns behind the infantry. At the two
sides of the main road and behind the Carlstädter were a
Combined Hungarian Battalion (rights) and the Croat Grenzer
battalion Mizich or 3rd Combined Croat Grenzer Banal battalion
(3rd Komp. Banalisten) from Sticker’s Bde (left). Three
squadrons of Erdödy Hussars, placed behind the hills, in the left
side of the main road had the mission to support Strà whenever
attacked. Other three Erdödy Sqns. Were on the left side of the
main road, behind and under the m. Zovo. Caldiero’s village
was defended by a battalion of the Callenberg Rgt. scattered
among the houses and up until the La Rocca strongpoint. A
Gyulai’s Rgt battalion occupied the area of the San Mattia and
La Rocca Heights. Two 6 pdrs. Guns were on La Rocca, and
other two same calibers on S.Mattia. The village of Colognola
was defended by the Babogredacz Croat battalion or 2nd
Combined Banal Grenzer while the area from that town until m.
Zovo was secured by the Sticker’s Bde.: two heavy 12 pdrs.
Guns and the 4th Croat Banal Grenzer battalion where on m.
Zovo; Colonel Sticker with his Colloredo battalion, two
Wurmser Hussars sqns. and one 2nd Hussar Sqn. were between
Colognola and the village of Lorgnan (Orgnano).
Suddenly at 8.00 O’clock a message reached Alvinczy at
Villanova: “Der Feind in mehrerer Kolonnen zum Angriff nahe”
(Enemy coming close to attack by several Columns). Also if
Jomini’s numbers (about the French strength) could seem
exaggerated (Augereau division with 8340 men and Massena
with 9540) the slow advance of the “Blue” columns had to be a
very impressive sight, viewing it from the hill above. Massena
had split his division in two columns: the right, directly engaged
in a frontal attack against Colognola, the Zovo and the Strà’s
Flank; the left, committed to perform a march to the right
Austrian side, outflanking it from Lavagno to Illasi. Augereau
began the day trying to back the Croats of the 7th, broadening
the front of the attack, later in the morning, on his right against
Caldiero and Gombion.
08.30 hrs. The first Massena’s Column was blocked by a strong
artillery fire against its flank. In the meanwhile General
Augereau Advance Guard had attacked Strà more times, always
repulsed by the 7th Grenzer’s rifle fire. The wind began to
enforce from North East, then arrived rain mixed to snow and
finally, around 9.00 hrs. a true snow storm with powerful cold
wind blasts. In some moments the rain seemed to win against
snow and for ten minutes streams of water descended from the
sky. Then ice and snow returned to master the clouds. In these
conditions all guns and howitzer were pinned in their positions.
Infantry had many problems to advance too. Second Massena’s
Column attacked the Colognola Ridge and mount Zovo
launching the elite Carabiniers against a wall of ice and wind.
Here, unluckily, general Launay was captured with 40 men of
that elite companies (besides someone referred Launay as
caught prisoner at Strà like if he should have been operating in
the Augereau’s Av.Gd).
During the morning General Alvinczy had ordered to move
forward the Villanova’s Reserve in order to reinforce
Hohenzollern. The first Austrian column to start was the
General Brabeck brigade (4 Btns.) putting in the main road its
4000 men with the order to reach Caldiero. The snowstorm
hardly slowed the forward march causing a lot of stops (many
for attempts to push forward the guns) and the Austrian
employed about 6 hrs and 30 minutes for a 7 km march. This
could have become a decisive detail for a French victory but
their troops were too numerically inferior to hope so. As was
impossible to put all Austrian column in road march in the same
large main way, the second formation, Major General Schubirz
brigade (5 btns., around 5000 men), started on the right side of
the road, directed to Soave and then to Colognola and San Zeno.
The third, last, column (Marquis de Provera and Lieut.Col.
Gavassini with 4 btns. And 1 sqn. hussars; around 3500 men)
started on the left main road’s side, marching in the storm over
Castelletto until Gombion and La Rotta. During the late
morning, actually, General Augereau had extended his front
rights until the Adige’s bank: a movement Hohenzollern tried to
stop before with three, after with all six Erdödy Hussars
squadrons.
At midday the situation slowly evolved in a Austrian right wing
crisis. Colonel (or Chef-de-Brigade) Dupuy launched his
“invincible” 32nd Demi Brigade against Colognola and the
Zovo. The French line half-brigade “en Tirailleurs ordre” (all
deployed as skirmishers) occupied the slope and the Zovo’s
hilltop while the last Augereau’s attempt to control Strà was a
new failure. The storm went by; the sky became cloudy, the air
foggy and the ice, mud. All troops were so exhausted that no
new attack could have begun without fresh reinforcements. The
time stopped in long, heavy pause until the 15.00 hrs. Now
Austrian reinforcements had to arrive.
General Brabeck’s brigade entered in Caldiero at 16.30, coming
from east, with the Commander in Chief Alvinczy.
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